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I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In 2009, Pennsylvania residents Christopher Carlton and Shalanda
Brown began a romantic relationship that resulted in Ms. Brown's preg-
nancy.' Unexpectedly, Ms. Brown left Mr. Carlton just four weeks before
the birth of their child without telling him where she was going.2 At the
time of separation, Mr. Carlton had not taken any action to protect his
parental rights over his unborn child.3
During her disappearance, Brown traveled to Utah, where she gave
birth and later relinquished her parental rights to The Adoption Center.'
Brown also executed a Birth Father Affidavit in which she stated she was
single and did not disclose the father's identity.' She later returned to
Pennsylvania and made efforts to rekindle her relationship with Carlton.6
When Carlton asked to see his child, Brown told him she gave birth to a
boy who had passed away, when in reality she gave birth to a girl and
placed the baby up for adoption.' Meanwhile, The Adoption Center in
Utah confirmed no one had registered as the putative father of the child
at the Utah Office of Vital Records or filed an acknowledgement of pa-
ternity at the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.8
In November 2010, after Brown's constant refusal to give Carlton any
information about his child, Carlton filed a paternity action in Penn-
sylvania.' By that time, adoption proceedings for the child were already
in progress in Utah. 0 A few weeks later, Brown finally told Carlton the
truth about their child." That very day, Carlton's Pennsylvania paternity
suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.1 2 When the adoption proceed-
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ings for the child were finalized in Utah on December 29, 2010, there
were no paternity proceedings pending either in Utah or Pennsylvania."
Carlton v. Brown depicts the reality for many putative fathers and the
various issues they face when attempting to exercise their parental
rights.1 4 A putative father is a man who either (1) claims to be the father
of a child to whom he has not established a legal relationship; or (2) is
alleged to be the father of a child born out of wedlock.'5 Recently, the
topic of unwed fathers"6 rights has gained popularity, as more unwed
fathers across the nation challenge the constitutionality of laws governing
their rights.'"
While many cases recognize unwed fathers' rights, such an acknowledg-
ment has not resolved the inequality between unwed fathers and unwed
mothers and has left the unwed mother in a far superior position than the
unwed father.' As such, the implementation of a national system that
ensures putative fathers have the opportunity to establish paternity could
better protect their rights."
Until the 1960s, an illegitimate child's relationship with their biological
parents was not constitutionally protected.2 0 Two U.S. Supreme Court
cases decided in 1968, Levy v. Louisiana2' and Glona v. American Guar.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 474 (addressing the issue of rights afforded to putative fathers who wish
to contest adoptions).
15. Putative Father Registry, AM. ACAD. OF AoovrioN Arry's, http://www.adoption-
attorneys.org/refinery/cache/pages/aaaa-page/birth-parents/putative-father-registry.html
[https://perma.cc/A6H6-ZXSY] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Putative Father
Registry].
16. The terms "unwed fathers" and "putative fathers" are used interchangeably
throughout this note.
17. See, e.g., H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 203 P.3d 943, 950 (Utah 2009) (indicating the putative
father challenged the adoption proceeding of his child, but the court did not afford him a
constitutional right to intervene); see also In re D.S., No. 16-0254, 2016 WL 1359134, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2016) (challenging termination of a father's parental rights where
the father was deported and there was no evidence that he intended to abandon his chil-
dren); Winkler v. Sherman, 137 A.D.3d 633, 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (holding the plain-
tiff, who was well over twenty-one years of age, did not have a constitutional right to the
identity of his biological father, given the strong presumption that his mother's husband,
who was listed on his birth certificate, is his father).
18. See, e.g., CYNTI-IIA H. DEBOSE, MASTElING Ano-rrIoN LAw & POLICY 48, 50
(Carolina Press 2015) (discussing the limited constitutional protections afforded to unwed
fathers in comparison to unwed mothers).
19. See, e.g., Mary Beck, A National Putative Father Registry, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 295,
301 (2007) (arguing a national putative father registry will protect the putative father's
rights by providing notice and opportunity to be heard in an adoption in any state).
20. DEBOSE, supra note 18, at 47.
21. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
2016] 59
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& Liab. Ins. Co.,2 were the first to recognize the mother-child relation-
ship warrants special protection, regardless of the mother's marital sta-
tus.2 3 In Levy, a mother's five illegitimate children brought a wrongful
death action after her death, but the lower courts ruled the state statute
allowing children to bring such claims precluded illegitimate children
from doing so. 24 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held
under the Equal Protection Clause that the state could not discriminate
against illegitimate children because their rights involved the "intimate
and familial relationship between a child and his mother," and when a
child brings forth a claim for damages, the wrongdoers should not be al-
lowed to go free merely because the child may be illegitimate.25 The
Court concluded the children were able to bring suit because their illegiti-
macy was not related to the wrongful death of the mother.26 In Glona,
the Court held the dismissal of a wrongful death action brought by a
mother for the death of her illegitimate son violated the Equal Protection
Clause.27 Despite the holdings in Levy and Glona, the preexisting laws
and perceptions about unwed fathers remained unchanged.28
This note argues courts should allow unwed fathers to exercise their
rights in more than just a limited number of circumstances and should
give them the same exclusivity to custody and presumption of parental
fitness as afforded unwed mothers. Part II discusses the landmark Su-
preme Court cases delineating putative fathers' rights. Part III explains
the views regarding protection of thwarted fathers' rights. Part IV ex-
plains the evolution of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and its objec-
tives regarding the establishment of the father-child relationship. Part V
addresses California and New Jersey's adoption of the UPA and provides
an in-depth analysis of their similarities and differences. Part VI analyzes
the presumption of fatherhood in Michael H. v. Gerald D .29 Finally, part
VII examines the use of putative father registries to establish paternity.
22. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
23. DEBOSE, supra note 18, at 47.
24. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69 (1968).
25. Id. at 71.
26. Id. at 72.
27. Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968).
28. See generally Erin Green, Note, Unwed Fathers' Rights in Adoption: The Virginia
Code vs. The Uniform Adoption Act, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 267, 269 (2005)
(discussing how the Supreme Court did not begin to recognize the rights of unwed fathers
until the early 1970s).
29. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
60 [Vol. 19:57
4
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 19 [2020], No. 1, Art. 2
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol19/iss1/2
A CHANCE FOR POSITIVE CHANGE
II. How COURTS HAVE DELINEATED PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS
Until recently, unwed fathers had no rights over their children because
courts often deemed them unfit as parents and therefore presumed them
to have no interest in their children.30 Furthermore, if a man was married
to a woman at the time she gave birth, he was presumed to be the child's
biological father; as a result, there was no guarantee that an unwed fa-
ther's relationship with his biological child would be constitutionally pro-
tected. In turn, this lack of constitutional protection effectively
deprived putative fathers both a right to notice of their child's adoption
proceedings and a right to prevent the mother from placing the child up
for adoption.3 2 Decades after the U.S. Supreme Court afforded constitu-
tional protection to unwed mothers, the Court slowly began to recognize
the rights of unwed fathers.3 3 In the "Unwed Father Cases," which
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court warranted constitutional pro-
tection to unwed fathers who established a relationship with their child.3 4
A. The First Step in Recognizing Unwed Fathers' Rights: Stanley v.
Illinois
Stanley v. Illinois" was the first case to recognize relationships between
unwed fathers and their children and afford constitutional protection to
unwed fathers' parental rights.36 In Stanley, a father of three children
brought suit against the state when, after the death of their mother, the
state removed his children from his care and placed them with court-ap-
pointed guardians.3 ' The father lived with the mother on-and-off for
eighteen years, during which time the three children were born to them.8
Pursuant to an Illinois statute, upon the death of the mother children of
30. Green, supra note 28.
31. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-15 (1989) (revealing the harsh
standard placed upon unwed fathers in attempting to rebut the presumption that they are
not the child's father); see also DEBOSE, supra note 18, at 49-50 (exploring the effects of
the Supreme Court's decision not to afford the biological father an opportunity to prove
paternity).
32. Tonya M. Zdon, Comment, Putative Fathers' Rights: Striking the Right Balance in
Adoption Laws, 20 WM. MrTcIlELL L. REv. 929, 931 (1994).
33. See DieBosE, supra note 18, at 48 (examining the trend in Supreme Court prece-
dent as moving away from the common law presumption that a child is the child of the
marital spouse).
34. Id.
35. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
36. See id. at 658 (holding an Illinois law denying putative fathers the right to a hear-
ing to determine their parental fitness after the death of the mother violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
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unwed fathers became wards of the State because there was an irrebut-
table statutory presumption that unwed fathers were unfit to retain cus-
tody of their children." Stanley claimed he was never proven to be an
unfit parent and-because the state could not deprive unwed mothers
and married fathers custody of their children absent such a showing-the
state violated his equal protection rights.40 The Court agreed with Stan-
ley and concluded the interests of a man who has "sired and raised" his
children warrant protection; further, if the father was deemed fit, the
State's interest in the children is insignificant.4 1 Nevertheless, the Stanley
decision did not extend unwed fathers and unwed mothers the same level
of constitutional protection, but served to rebut the traditional view that
unwed fathers were generally absent from their children's lives and there-
fore unfit as parents.42
B. Development of Standards for Protecting Fathers' Rights: Quilloin
v. Walcott
Although Stanley afforded some protection to the relationship between
a biological father and his child, it left unclear whether such protection
existed in every case or only when a custodial relationship was estab-
lished.43 The Court later addressed this dilemma six years after Stanley in
Quilloin v. Walcott,4 4 in which the Court first developed the "best interest
of the child" standard.4 5
In Quilloin v. Walcott, Quilloin fathered a child with Walcott, a woman
to whom he was never married.46 Three years later, Walcott married a
different man-the child being in her custody at all times.4 7 After nearly
a decade, Walcott's husband sought to adopt Walcott and Quilloin's
child.4 8 Quilloin, who neither previously sought custody of the child nor
objected to the child's living with his mother and step-father, attempted
39. Id.; Susan M. Zajac, Doctrine of Family Integrity Protecting the Parental Rights of
Unwed Fathers Who Have Substantial Relationships with Their Children, 13 CONN. L.
REV.145, 155 (1980).
40. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
41. Id. at 651-52, 657-58.
42. Green, supra note 28, at 270.
43. Tyler M. Hawkins, Comment, Adoption of Infants Born to Unaware, Unwed Fa-
thers: A Statutory Proposal that Better Balances the Interests Involved, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
1335, 1337 (2009).
44. 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978).
45. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978) (holding a proposed adoption
was in the "best interest of the child").
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to block the adoption process and obtain visitation rights.4 9 The trial
court granted the adoption over Quilloin's objection."o Quilloin's case
made its way to the Supreme Court, where he contended the adoption
violated the Equal Protection Clause because the state denied him the
same authority to veto an adoption it afforded to married or divorced
parents and unwed mothers." The Court focused on Quilloin's lack of
involvement in raising his child and rejected his argument.52 Further, the
Court held a father's parental rights could be terminated if the court
found doing so is in the best interest of the child-especially if the father
never attempted to establish a relationship with his child.5 3 Similarly, a
father who never sought custody, the Court concluded, lacked authority
to contest the adoption of his child.54
The decision in Quilloin thus established a principle contravening that
of Stanley (namely, that the court should not afford protection to an un-
wed father who fails to participate in raising his children to a significant
degree).5 ' Nevertheless, both cases determined the legal protection af-
forded a putative father would be based on the extent of the relationship
established with his child.56 Moreover, both Quillion and Stanley demon-
strated courts' willingness to take a substantial leap towards recognizing
the rights of putative fathers." However, both cases failed to explain two
key issues: the extent of parenting behavior warranting constitutional
protection of their parental rights, and the time frame within which a pu-
tative father must establish a relationship with his child.5 8
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 252.
52. See id. at 256 (pointing out the father in question was never involved in his child's
life).
53. Id.
54. See id. (recognizing the extent of commitment to the welfare of a child in deter-
mining whether a father, whom never shouldered meaningful responsibility for raising the
child, has a right to contest the adoption).
55. See Hawkins, supra note 43, at 1338 (emphasizing the holdings of these two cases
are at extreme ends of the spectrum, which leaves room for courts to interpret the parental
rights of a putative father).
56. See id. (suggesting both cases weigh the amount of responsibility the putative fa-
ther puts forth in determining his rights).
57. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (recognizing the Due Process
Clause would be violated if a family was broken up without a showing of parental unfit-
ness); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding unwed biological fathers
are entitled to a hearing on parental fitness).
58. Hawkins, supra note 43, at 1338.
2016] 63
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C. Two Steps Forward and One Step Back: Caban v. Mohammed
One year after Quilloin, the Supreme Court further clarified the rights
of putative fathers in Caban v. Mohammed,5 9 a very similar yet distin-
guishable case. Caban challenged the constitutionality of a New York
statute allowing unwed mothers to block adoption proceedings concern-
ing her child by withholding consent without affording unwed fathers the
same rights.60 Caban and Mohammed lived together for five years, dur-
ing which time they had two children.6 The birth certificate listed Caban
as the father, and he lived with the children until he separated from their
mother in 1973.62 One year later, Mohammed married another man and
she and her children took up residence with her new husband.63 Over the
years, Caban maintained contact with his children.64 Eventually, the chil-
dren's step-father petitioned to adopt them, and Caban and his new wife
objected and cross-petitioned for adoption.65 The lower court granted
Mohammed's husband's petition to adopt the children, thereby terminat-
ing Caban's parental rights.6 6
In Caban, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the gender-based dis-
tinction between unwed fathers and unwed mothers provided in the state
statute, but ultimately held the distinction did not bear any substantial
relation to the state's interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegiti-
mate children.67 Building upon Stanley, Caban also declared unwed fa-
thers could secure their parental rights in a much shorter time period
than the eighteen years set forth in Stanley" and extended protection to
men who created and maintained a relationship with their child.69 In ad-
dition, Caban established courts have to prove-rather than presume-
unwed fathers are unfit, as courts do with unwed mothers.70 Taking Stan-
ley and Quilloin one step further, Caban also presented the necessary
59. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
60. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1979); see also Hawkins, supra note
43, at 1338 (indicating a putative father would not have to wait as long as eighteen years to
earn his parental rights).




65. Id. at 383.
66. Id. at 383-84.
67. Id. at 391.
68. See id. at 382 (showing a sufficiently substantial relationship where the unwed
parents lived together for approximately five years). But see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 646 (1972) (showing a substantial relationship where the unwed parents lived together
for eighteen years).
69. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S 380, 393 (1979).
70. Id. at 394.
64 [Vol. 19:57
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factors for establishing an unwed father's parental rights, including:
whether he lived with the children and their mother for some time, held
himself out as the children's father, and provided the children with care
and support."
D. Creating Putative Father's Rights by Evidencing Responsibility and
Interest: Lehr v. Robertson
In the wake of these three Supreme Court cases, many states began to
enact statutes to protect the newly recognized rights of unwed fathers.7 2
Of the Unwed Father Cases, Lehr v. Robertson," was the first to review
these statutes and discuss unwed fathers' entitlement to notice of adop-
tion proceedings.74 Lehr sought to vacate an adoption order concerning
his two-year-old daughter on the grounds that the order violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." The Supreme Court referenced Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban to
address Lehr's claim of a protected liberty interest, focusing on the rela-
tionship between Lehr and his daughter.7 6 The Court specifically scruti-
nized the following facts: although Lehr lived with the mother before
their daughter's birth and visited the mother at the hospital, he never
provided them with financial support, his name was not on the birth cer-
tificate, and he did not live with either at any time." The Court reasoned
a mere biological link does not warrant constitutional protection and fur-
ther held an unwed father can acquire substantial protection under the
Due Process Clause by demonstrating full commitment to the responsibil-
ities of parenthood-as evidenced by his participation in raising his child
and maintaining personal contact.
Further, Lehr laid out steps an unwed father must take to transform a
biological relationship with his child into a constitutionally protected
one.7 9 Although the Lehr factors may help an unwed father's relation-
71. Id. at 389.
72. See Robbin P. Gonzalez, The Rights of Putative Fathers to Their Infant Children in
Contested Adoptions: Strengthening State Laws that Currently Deny Adequate Protection 13
Mich. J. Gender & L. 39, 45 (2006) (describing the implementation of a putative father
registry by some states).
73. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
74. Gonzalez, supra note 72.
75. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253, 259 (1983).
76. See id. at 253, 261-62 (distinguishing Lehr from the unwed fathers in Stanley,
Caban, and Quilloin by emphasizing those cases contained the establishment, or the poten-
tial establishment, of a "clear and significant" parent-child relationship).
77. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1983).
78. Id. at 261.
79. See id. at 261-62 (indicating an unwed father's interest is protected when he shows
full commitment to establishing a relationship with his child).
2016] 65
9
Florant: Legal Hurdles Putative Fathers Face
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
THE SCHOLAR
ship with his child receive constitutional protection, a father who does not
grasp the unique opportunity to develop a relationship with his child will
have no constitutional right to compel a state to listen to his opinion con-
cerning the best interests of the child.so Apparently, the Court did not
consider the likely ramifications of its decision in Lehr. Perhaps Lehr's
standard should be applied in child support cases, where the mere exis-
tence of a biological link has been deemed sufficient to hold an unwed
father financially responsible towards the child. If the mere existence of a
biological link does not warrant protection of an unwed father's rights,
then a biological link should not suffice for holding an unwed father fi-
nancially responsible towards the child. Unfortunately, courts have yet to
explore this idea." In short, Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr illustrate
the amount of protection afforded to an unwed father's relationship is a
direct result of the amount of responsibility he has assumed in the raising
of his child.8 2
III. EXPLORING THE APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT CASES TO
THWARTED FATHERS' RIGHTS
Courts have consistently held a putative father who has established a
substantial relationship with his child will be afforded constitutional pro-
tection, and so, his rights may not be terminated without notice and hear-
ing. Conversely, the putative father who has failed to accept any
parental responsibilities will not receive constitutional protection.8 4
Unfortunately, these decisions have not addressed whether courts will
afford protection to putative fathers with "thwarted rights."85  A
thwarted father is one who, "through no fault of his own, has been unable
to establish a relationship with his child."8 6 Attempts to resolve this issue
have resulted in inconsistent rulings and deference to the states. While
80. Id. at 262.
81. See Robert Franklin, Wisconsin: Court Denies Rights to Father with Substantial
Relationship with Child, NAT'L PARENTS ORG. (Feb. 16, 2015), https://nationalparentsor-
ganization.org/recent-articles?id=22195 [https://perma.cc/REY2-C7XF] (suggesting the
Court used a double standard when calculating child support payments and when posed
with the option to afford constitutional rights to punitive fathers).
82. Cf Hawkins, supra note 43, at 1340-41 (highlighting how the Court's decision to
afford constitutional protection to unwed fathers heavily depends on whether a father es-
tablishes a substantial relationship with his child).
83. Kristin Morgan-Tracy, Comment, Right of the Thwarted Father to Veto the Adop-
tion of His Child, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1695, 1700 (1994).
84. Id. at 1700-01.
85. Id. at 1701.
86. Id.
87. See generally id. 1701-15 (examining the various state court decisions that have
attempted to address the unwed fathers' rights).
66 [Vol. 19:57
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some courts are willing to extend protection to thwarted fathers, others
have been reluctant."
The issue is evident in Lavell v. Adoption Institute,8 9 where a father
brought action against The Adoption Institute to prevent adoption pro-
ceedings and obtain custody of his child."o Lavell and his child's mother
lived together in Michigan.9' They later moved to California, expecting
their second child.92 The couple lived together and held themselves out
as husband and wife, even though they did not participate in a marriage
ceremony.93 The mother left Lavell with their first child and later gave
birth to their second child, whom she immediately placed in the care of
The Adoption Institute without notifying Lavell.94 Lavell filed an ac-
knowledgement of paternity in Michigan for both children and sought
custody of the second child by taking the child into his home, but The
Adoption Institute prevented him from taking the child because the
claimed mother, being single, had already relinquished her parental rights
and was allowed to do so under a California statute.95 Nevertheless, the
court affirmed the lower court's findings that Lavell legitimized his child
before the mother relinquished her parental rights and was thus fit for
custody because he made earnest efforts to provide a home for the child
even after the mother attempted to thwart him.96 Since Lavell, many
courts have been unwilling to embrace a policy favoring legitimation by a
putative father.97 Indeed, states like California have read their parentage
statutes as requiring a mother's consent before a putative father may le-
gitimize his child. 9 8
IV. STATUTORY ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING DISCRIMINATION
BETWEEN PUTATIVE FATHERS' AND MOTHERS' RIGHTS
While the Unwed Father Cases and the many state statutes that fol-
lowed focused on the newly-recognized rights of unwed fathers, the
88. Id. at 1707.
89. 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).




94. See id. (stating the father had no prior knowledge of the mother's desire to leave).
95. See id. at 368-69 (noting the father diligently sought his children, secured a house
to care for his children, and requested that the mother marry him).
96. Id. at 369.
97. Diane C. Wilson, Note, The Uniform Parentage Act: What it Will Mean for the
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UPA 99 sought to make children its primary focus.1 00 In fact, UPA em-
phasizes the most important rights were not those of the parents but
those of the child. 0 1 The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) first adopted UPA in 1973 and the
American Bar Association (ABA) approved it in 1974.102 Because cases
like Levy and Glona found the unequal treatment of children based on
the marital status of their biological parents unconstitutional, UPA eradi-
cated discriminatory statutory distinctions between illegitimate and legiti-
mate children that had existed for decades.o3 In addition to treating
children equally and promoting equality among single parents, UPA es-
tablished provisions for determining paternity, 0 4 rules for presumption
of parentage,os and guidelines for establishing a parent-child
relationship.106
UPA recognizes four kinds of fathers: acknowledged fathers, adjudi-
cated fathers, alleged fathers, and presumed fathers.1 0 7 First, an acknowl-
edged father is one who has established a father-child relationship
through a voluntary claim of paternity, with the consent of the mother."0
UPA conceptualizes an acknowledged father as a biological father who is
not married to the mother of the child but who nevertheless maintains a
99. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, §§ 101-905 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
100. See Wilson, supra note 97, at 204 (providing substantive legal equality for all
children regardless of the marital status of their parents).
101. Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1974).
102. Id. at 1.
103. Megan S. Calvo, Uniform Parentage Act-Say Goodbye to Donna Reed: Recog-
nizing Stepmothers' Rights, 30 W. NEw ENG. L. REv.773, 777 (2008).
104. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, Art. 3 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000)
(amended 2002).
105. UmeF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000)
(amended 2002).
106. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 201 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000)
(amended 2002).
107. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 102 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000)
(amended 2002). The Act was amended in 2002 in an effort to address issues concerning
developments in reproductive and scientific technologies-mainly those regarding the use
of DNA testing in determining a child's genetic parent. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 102
CMT. (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000) (amended 2002). There are cur-
rently seven states that have adopted the 2002 version of the UPA: Delaware, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, Wyoming, and Utah. Legislative Fact Sheet -
Parentage Act, NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. L. (2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act [https://perma.cc/H7BT-UT7N].
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relationship with her and is present at the child's birth.'09 Second, an
adjudicated father is one a court determines to be the father of a child. 10
This type of father may or may not be the biological father.'1 1 Third, an
alleged father is one who either alleges himself, or is alleged by someone
else, to be the biological father or a possible biological father of a child
but whose paternity has yet to be determined.112 Fourth, presumed fa-
thers are addressed in section 204 of UPA, which lists the instances
wherein paternity is presumed."' For example, under UPA a man is pre-
sumed to be the father of a child if he is linked to the child through mar-
riage.1' 4 In other words, a presumption of paternity exists where a child
was born during the time the man was married to the mother or if the
marriage has terminated and the child was born within 300 days thereaf-
ter. 15 Moreover, paternity is presumed if:
... after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child mar-
ried each other in apparent compliance with law, whether or not the
marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he voluntarily asserted
his paternity of the child, and the assertion is in a record filed with
[state agency maintaining birth records]; he agreed to be and is
named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate; or he
promised in a record to support the child as his own.116
Once a presumption of paternity is established, it may be difficult to
challenge it."' UPA also protects presumed fathers from the claims of
other fathers, including biological fathers, by placing limitations on chal-
lenges raised against the presumed father." The presumption that a
child born during a marriage is conceived from that marital union has
long been connected to the continuous efforts of courts and states to pre-
109. Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 909, 915 (2006).
110. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 102(2) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
111. Dowd, supra note 109, at 915.
112. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 102(3) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
113. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204 (NAT' CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000)
(amended 2002).
114. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 201(a)(1)-(2) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
ST. L. 2000) (amended 2002).
115. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 201(a)(1)-(2) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
ST. L. 2000) (amended 2002).
116. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 201(a)(4) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
117. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr, § 204(b) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002) (requiring adjudication to rebut a presumption of paternity).
118. Dowd, supra note 109, at 915.
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serve the image of the traditional family.11 9 While many courts continue
to adhere to this image, preservation of traditional familial stereotypes is
less prevalent in contemporary society. 120
V. STATE ADOPTION OF UPA
In accordance with UPA, many states have enacted statutes containing
"presumed father" provisions mirroring those in UPA, while others have
revised the rebuttable presumption that a putative father is unfit for pa-
rental rights.12 1 In particular, California and New Jersey have repro-
duced UPA's language pertaining to presumed fathers.12 2
A. California
Prior to enacting UPA, California did not recognize the rights of puta-
tive fathers.1 23 Although both parents were required to provide support
for the child under California law, the mother was the only parent enti-
tled to child custody, services, and earnings.1 24 While putative fathers
were periodically allowed visitation rights over the objections of the
mother, they had no rights to notice of adoption proceedings.12 5
It was not until after Stanley that California allowed establishing puta-
tive father's rights through legitimation.1.2 6 Section 7611 of the California
Family Code (CFC), for example, is an exact replica of the standard laid
out in section 204 of UPA.1.2 7 Moreover, the CFC, like UPA, is premised
on the presumption of paternity through marriage.128 However, a key
119. See Calvo, supra note 103, at 781-82 (claiming courts today adhere to the pre-
sumption of legitimacy from early common law and consider it a foundational principle).
120. Id. at 782.
121. See id. at 777-83 (stating twenty-one states have adopted a version of UPA's
presumed-father provision, with language variations in certain jurisdictions).
122. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2014) (providing the same presumption of
paternity language listed in UPA § 204); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17 (West 1998) (reiterating
similar presumption of paternity language as listed in UPA § 204).
123. Wilson, supra note 97, at 195.
124. Id. at 195-96.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 195-96.
127. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002) (stating a man is presumed to be the father, if after the birth of the
child, he and the mother were married); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2014) (reiterating
UPA § 204's standard that a person is presumed to be the parent of the child if they marry
the child's mother after the child's birth).
128. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204 (NATL CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002) (specifying a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he and
the mother are married and a child is born during the marriage); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611
(West 2014) (declaring a person is presumed to be the natural parent of a child if married
or attempted to marry the natural mother of the child).
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difference between UPA and the CFC relates to the attainment of a pre-
sumption of paternity through a potentially invalid marriage prior to the
birth of the child.129 While UPA contains no provisions detailing how to
or who must declare the attempted marriage invalid,13 0 under the CFC
only a court can declare an attempted marriage prior to the child's birth
invalid.
The CFC also distinguishes itself from UPA by presuming a man is the
father if the child in question is born within 300 days after cohabitation
with the child's mother has ended and requires no further actions on his
part.1.32 Further, UPA states, where there is an attempted marriage prior
to the child's birth, the presumed father must assert his paternity over the
child and record the assertion with a state agency-regardless if the mar-
riage is valid or not.33 If the father has not made such an assertion, he
must show he has agreed to be listed as child's father on the birth certifi-
cate or has promised to support the child. 134 Conversely, California only
requires the presumed father agree to be listed on the child's birth certifi-
cate or to support the child through a voluntary promise or court
order.135
Furthermore, the CFC provides another scenario for determining a
presumed father: that is, where "the child is in utero after the death of the
[biological father],"136 and in connection with section 249.5 of the Califor-
nia Probate Code, "was in utero using the [biological father]'s genetic
material within two years after a certificate of death was issued or a judg-
ment determining the [biological father]'s death was entered, whichever
occurs first."137
129. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002) (permitting room for interpretation because the legislature does not
explicitly require courts to determine issues of marriage validity and termination of cohabi-
tation). But see CAL. FAM. COC § 7611(b) (West 2014) (recognizing only courts hold the
power to declare marriage invalid).
130. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, § 204(a)(3) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'IRS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
131. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(b)(1) (West 2014).
132. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RIS ON UNIF. ST.
L. 2000) (amended 2002) (referencing several other actions required before the person is
presumed to be the father) with CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(b)(2) (West 2014) (emphasizing
an attempted marriage that is invalid without a court order determines whether a person is
presumed to be the natural parent).
133. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 204(a)(4) (NAT'L CONE. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
134. Id.
135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(c) (West 2014).
136. Id. § 7611(f).
137. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2006).
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While UPA requires another man be adjudicated the father of a child
in order to rebut a presumption of paternity,' the CFC requires the
person challenging the presumption to show, at the time of conception,
the presumed father was impotent or sterile or the mother was not
cohabitating with her husband."9 A presumption can also be rebutted by
blood tests requested by filing a motion, "within two years of the child's
birth by either (1) the husband or the presumed father, (2) the child,
through a guardian ad litem, or (3) the mother of the child, if the natural
father of the child has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity." 40
B. New Jersey
New Jersey's statute for presumption of fatherhood is worded similarly
to the CFC, providing for the same scenarios in which a man will be
deemed a "presumed father" whether or not the child is born during a
valid marriage.1 4 1 A key difference between the California and New
Jersey presumption statutes, however, is that the latter makes specific
mention of presumption of paternity concerning children who have not
yet attained majority.142 Rather, the New Jersey statute looks to whether
the presumed father (1) took the minor child into his home and held out
the child to be his; (2) supported the child while openly holding out that
the child was his; or (3) acknowledged paternity in a writing and filed it
with a local registry of vital statistics and such paternity is not disputed by
the mother within a reasonable time after she has been informed about
the filing. 1 4 3 Although New Jersey does not provide any specific method
for rebutting the presumption, the statute implements a "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard by which a party may rebut it.1 4 4 Finally, if
conflicting presumptions exist, the presumption with the most logical and
policy-oriented facts controls.1 4 5
VI. DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH REBUTTING
THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION
Despite all the substantive changes states made to their marital pre-
sumption statutes, courts maintain wide discretion in interpreting them,
138. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, § 201(b) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L.
2000) (amended 2002).
139. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2014).
140. Id. § 7541(a)-(c).
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particularly where a third party seeks to adopt a putative father's child.14 6
Of the cases addressing the issue of the presumption of paternity, Michael
H. v. Gerald D., which began in the California courts and was eventually
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, is the most prominent.14 7
Michael H. was involved in an adulterous relationship with Carole D.,
which resulted in the conception of a child; the child was born while Car-
ole was still married to another man, Gerald D. 4 8 Gerald was listed on
the child's birth certificate and continuously held the child out to be his,
but soon after the birth, Michael H. was informed that he could be the
father.149 Michael and Carole both took blood tests a few months after
the child's birth that showed a 98.07% probability Michael was the fa-
ther.15 0 Soon thereafter, and for various time periods during the first four
years of the child's life, Michael H. lived with both Carole and the child
and held the child out as his own.151 Michael later sought visitation rights
to the child, but the Superior Court, strictly interpreting section 621 of
the CFC, ultimately declined them because evidence submitted by both
Carole and Gerald demonstrated Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent
at the time of conception.152 Michael subsequently challenged the deci-
sion on the grounds that the court had violated his procedural and sub-
stantive due process rights.153 Victoria, the child, also challenged the
decision on the basis that she was entitled to the preservation of her de
facto relationship'5 4 with Michael as well as her relationship with
Gerald.5 5
146. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (explaining that under
California law, illegitimate children are treated just like legitimate children).
147. Munonyedi Ugbode, Note, Who's Your Daddy?: Why the Presumption of Legiti-
macy Should Be Abandoned in Vermont, 34 VT. L. REv. 683, 688 (2010).
148. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
149. Id. at 113-14.
150. Id. at 114.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 113-15.
153. Id. at 116.
154. Id. "The de facto relationship focuses on basic elements such as the type of rela-
tionship established between the child and the third party, whether the third party was a
part of the same household as the child or whether the third party took on support obliga-
tions." Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines:
How Should the Uniform Parentage Act Define "Parent"?, 94 IoWA L. REV. 691, 699
(2009). A de facto parent is one who has participated in the child's life as a member of the
child's family but has to biological relation to the child. Id. at 699-700. Such a parent must
have lived with the child, and with the consent or encouragement of the child's legal par-
ent, perform a share of caretaking functions at least to the same extent as the legal parent.
Id. at 700.
155. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116 (1989).
2016] 73
17
Florant: Legal Hurdles Putative Fathers Face
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
THE SCHOLAR
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court focused solely on the issue of
whether the type of relationship between Michael and Victoria typically
receives constitutional protection.1 5 6 The Court rejected Michael's argu-
ment that Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr all establish biological fa-
therhood coupled with an established paternal relationship creates a
liberty interest because, according to the Court, these cases rested upon
traditional notions of family relationships and not upon the factors he
referenced."s' The Court also contended, while most states allow natural
fathers, including those who have not established a relationship with the
child, to rebut a marital presumption, the most important factor is
whether these states award parental rights to the natural father of a child
conceived during and born into the marriage. 15' The Court found that no
case awarded such rights.5 9 With regard to Victoria's assertions, the
Court held multiple paternity is traditionally unrecognized, and allowing
a child to bring forth a claim of illegitimacy or rebut a marital presump-
tion serves no purpose other than to disrupt what might otherwise be a
peaceful marital union.16 0 The facts and reasoning of Michael H. demon-
strate the difficulty of rebutting the marital presumption because courts
hold the preservation of the family unit in high regard.1 6 1 However,
when the court uses the "preservation of the family unit" rationale in this
way, the court further restricts the already limited avenues that afford
putative fathers the opportunity to establish their parental rights. It is as
though the hand offering a remedy is the same one taking it away.
VII. IMPLEMENTING PUTATIVE FATHER REGISTRIES
To ESTABLISH PATERNITY
When determining whether a putative father's rights deserve recogni-
tion or whether a putative father has demonstrated a commitment to his
parental responsibilities, courts have often looked to factors such as
whether he lived with the mother or the child after the birth of the child,
whether he provided support to the child, or whether he publicly ac-
knowledged the child as his own.1 62 However, as in Carlton, courts also
156. Id. at 124.
157. Id. at 123.
158. Id. at 127.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 131.
161. See Alexandra Eisman, The Extension of the Presumption of Legitimacy to Same-
Sex Couples In New York, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 580 (2013) (suggesting
Michael H. v. Gerald D. shows that courts are more willing to promote "family units" than
the rights of putative fathers).
162. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1226 (Cal. 1992).
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consider the father's initiation of legal custody proceedings or his regis-
tration with a state system acknowledging paternity.1 .6 3
Currently, thirty states-excluding California and New Jersey-help
putative fathers establish paternity through putative father registries.1 64
Putative father registries enable unwed fathers to acknowledge paternity,
or the possibility of paternity for a child born out of wedlock, volunta-
rily.1.6 5 The acknowledgment of paternity through putative father regis-
tries benefits fathers and children because, upon timely registration,
fathers are guaranteed notice to adoption proceedings and any action
pertaining to the termination of his parental rights.' 6 6 Moreover, the
type of information required registering paternity varies from state to
state, but federal mandates require, at a minimum, basic information re-
garding parties who may be involved.'67
Due to the lack of publicity for putative father registries, many men do
not know they exist and thus lose out on the full benefits of registering as
a child's biological father.168 In addition, fathers who are aware of the
registries may shy away due to the difficulty of determining which state
registration they should file in or the possibility that filing a registration
163. See, e.g., Carlton v. Brown, 323 P.3d 571, 575 (Utah 2014) (suggesting
Mr. Carlton's parental rights would have been protected if he had taken action to establish
them).
164. States that have enacted putative father registries are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. State Putative Father Registries, N.H JUDICIAL
BRANC-l (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.courts.state.nh.us/probate/registrylist.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TN9L-MTTD].
165. See Beck, supra note 19, at 298 (arguing a national putative father registry will
protect putative fathers' rights should they actively seek to establish paternity).
166. Putative Father Registry, supra note 15.
167. Id. Examples of the types of information required on an acknowledgement of
paternity include: the current name, address, social security number, and date of birth of
both parents; the child's current full name, date of birth, and place of birth; signatures of
the mother, the father, witnesses or notaries; a statement signed by both parents stating
they understand that signing the affidavit is voluntary and that they understand their rights,
responsibilities, options and consequences. Id.
168. See Beck, supra note 19, at 298 (revealing media attention does not focus on the
potential benefits of putative father registries); see also Kevin N. Maillard, Sex & the Single
Man: What if Your Partner Has a Kid?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.theatlantic
.com/national/archive/2014/04/sex-and-the-single-man/360979 [https://perma.cc/97KX-
XU92] (suggesting the putative father registry programs are too inconspicuous or complex,
for people to understand the benefits brought by these registries).
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could subject them to child support obligations.16 9 Despite the many fac-
tors that may deter a putative father from using these registries,17 0 the
problems with putative father registries that do exist can be minimized, if
not eliminated altogether. For example, setting up a national putative
registry could help alleviate some of the issues, but this approach would
fully depend on the enactment of putative father registries by additional
states.7 Under this arrangement, if a putative father timely registered,
states with functional putative father registries would ensure he receives
notice of dependency or adoption proceedings concerning his child.' 7 2
Furthermore, enacting a national putative father registry would facilitate
notice of adoption proceedings to unwed fathers in interstate adoption
situations because information the father submits to the state registry
would be transmitted to the national database.17 3
Encouraging states to enact putative father registries also comes with
its own advantages. For example, eliminating the publication of such re-
gistries in newspapers protects putative fathers' privacy rights.17 4 Fur-
thermore, putative father registries also help the mother in several ways,
for instance: (1) they relieve her of the need to inform the potential fa-
ther about her pregnancy or adoption of the child, (2) they inform her
about whether a man actually wishes to assume financial and custodial
responsibilities for the child, and (3) they protect her privacy by not re-
quiring her to divulge her sexual contacts to adoption agencies, courts, or
adoptive parents.17 ' Finally, putative father registries promote secure
adoption placements because a putative father who does not make a
timely filing will not be guaranteed notice to any proceedings concerning
the child.17 6
169. See Beck, supra note 19, at 298 (showing how putative fathers will not use the
registries because state relocation is very common and many people do not want the bur-
den of being a parent).
170. See, e.g., Maillard, supra note 168 (displaying various factors that deter putative
fathers from using putative father registries). Some information asked of unwed fathers
registering at putative father registries include their partners' height, weight, social security
number, possible date(s) of sexual intercourse, and more. Id.
171. See Beck, supra note 19, at 298 (contending that establishing a national putative
father registry would eliminate the common problems resulting from unwed mothers and
their children crossing state lines).
172. Id. at 301.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 310.
175. Id. at 311-13.
176. See id at 313 (claiming requiring a father to timely file in the registry will protect
the state's interest in providing efficiency and permanency for children).
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It is important to note that nationalizing putative father registries bene-
fits children the most.177 Registering putative fathers in a national regis-
try, although not a petition for custody or a determination of paternity,17
ensures the child has a diligent and invested father who wishes to partici-
pate in his custodial and financial care, and if the putative father has not
registered, the child is ensured prompt placement with an adoptive
family.179
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the recognition of unwed father rights has increased substan-
tially since the 1970s, the vast majority of court decisions have yet to ad-
dress the many issue putative fathers continue to face. As such, courts
should continue to level the playing field for unwed fathers and mothers
by providing both parents constitutionally protected rights to the child
and applying the presumption of parental fitness to both-unless facts
and circumstances require otherwise. Until this occurs, however, it is evi-
dent from longstanding court decisions like Carlton that putative fathers
who desire protection of their parental rights should demonstrate paren-
tal responsibilities or establish paternity through state putative father re-
gistries. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of putative father registries
depends on the timely filing by the putative father in the appropriate ju-
risdiction and the extent to which the putative father knows the required
information. Putative father registries, if implemented on a national
scale, could be a step in the right direction for parenthood equality be-
tween unwed fathers and mothers.
Additionally, although establishing a national putative father registry
provide benefits, doing so requires twenty additional states to jump on
the putative father registry bandwagon. Even then, if an unwed father
demonstrates commitment and still unsuccessfully attempts to establish
his parental responsibilities, he should take comfort in knowing courts
will afford him some kind of protection regardless if he used a putative
father registry. As for Christopher Carlton, the Pennsylvania man who
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain custody of his daughter after the
mother lied to him about her status, the Utah Supreme Court's holding
177. Id.
178. Maillard, supra note 168.
179. See Beck, supra note 19, at 313 (supporting a national putative father registry
system that protects a father's right to his natural born children, advances the safety rights
of the mother, and supports the state's interest in providing permanency for children).
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that the Utah Adoption Act's imposition of a deadline on out-of-state
fathers violated his due process rights has given him a second chance.180
180. Brooke Adams, Court Gives Dad Second Chance in Adoption, SALT LAKE Tmia.,
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